The paper examines permutation generators which are designed using four rounds of the Data Encryption Standard and a single pseudorandom function. We have proved that such generators are pseudorandom only if the pseudorandom function is used internally at least five times. The proof is given using two different approaches: deterministic and probabilistic. Some cryptographic implications are also discussed.
Introduction
Random number generators are commonly used in many different areas of science. However truly random generators create some problems. The most evident is the unreproducibifity of generated numbers, so that it is impossible to repeat the same experiment.
Another problem is related to the assessment of randomness of generators.
Classical pseudorandom generators are deterministic algorithms that provide numbers which "look" like random ones. As they have well-defined mathematical structures, they can be analysed easily. The basic measurement of classical pseudorandom generators is the similarity of generated numbers to truly random ones. Yao [8] redefined the notion of pseudorandomness in terms of complesity theory. A generator is said to be pseudorandom if it is "indistinguishable" from the truly random one, assuming polynomially bounded computing resources.
Cryptographers have always been interested in how to extend truly random "seeds" (n-bit long) into &-bit output strings in such a way that the output is indistinguishable from a truly random string (k = 2,3,. -.). Blum and Micali [l] introduced the notion of cryptographically strong pseudorandom bit generators (CSB). Levin [3] proved that such generators exist if and only if one-way functions exist. There are several implementations of CSB generators (for details see for esamplc [2] ). Goldreich, Goldwasser and Micali [2] showed that it is possible to construct pseudorandom functions using CSB generators. The nest step in the theory of pseudorandomness is due to Luby and Rackoff [4] . They used pseudorandom functions to generate pseudorandom permutations using three rounds of the Data Encryption Standard (DES) and three different pseudorandom functions.
Ohnishi [9] proved that pseudorandom permutations can be obtained using three rounds of the DES and two different pseudorandom functions. During Eurocrypt'89 Zheng, Matsumoto and Imai [9] presented some new results about pseudorandom permutations. They gave a construction of distinguishing circuits for all permutation generators which use three rounds of DES and a single pseudorandom function. They also posed the following problem:
Proue or disprove that from one pseudorandom function, one can obtain in some way a pseudorandom (invertible) permutation applying four rounds of DES.
In this paper we solve the problem.
Notations and definitions
Let I, = {0,1}" be the set of all 2" binary strings of length n. 
Having a sequence of functions f i f2, ---, f; F,, we can determine the concatenation
Of course, + ( f i i f 2 , . -* , f i ) E P2n.
We can now rephrase the previous results. Luby and Rackoff [4] proved that $(g, h, f )
is a pseudorandom permutation generator if 9 , h, f axe different pseudorandom functions.
Ohnishi In this paper we are going to prove that $( f , f, f , f') is pseudorandom permutation generator for i = 2 , 3 , -. -. To shorten our considerations, we axe going to use a reference permutation generator (instead of a truly random one). Its structure should be as close as possible to the structure of + ( f l f , f , f i ) . As $ ( f , f , g ) is pseudorandom, we take +( f , f , f , g ) as the reference one. Obviously, it is pseudorandom (the proof is omitted). Intuitively, taking out the first f from +( f , f , y ) , we get $ ( f , g ) which is no longer pseudorandom. Therefore, putting up an additional round for f to $(f,f,g), we obtain $( f, f , f,g) which must bc pseudorandom (the additional round docs not introduce symmetry).
The proof of pseudorandomness of +( f , f, f , f') for i = 2,3, -. -will be given in two different ways. In the next Section, it will be carried out using some dcterministic arguments. Later on we show that the proof can also be based on some probabilistic ones. The generator produces the joliowing outputs: This example shows us some general properties of a DDC, namely:
PI As it must work for all possible selections of j, it can be seen as a network which generates the same signal using two different paths. Each path can be expressed by equivalent algebraic formulae.
P2
If there is a DDC, it can always be designed using the oracle gate with input (0,o) as the top one which initiates both paths.
P3
Modulo-2 operation @ used outside oracle gates, removes input expression from the output. Now we will prove the main lemma of the section. Without a loss of generality, we can consider generator +(f, f , f, f2) instead of +(f, f, f, p ) for i = 2,3,. . .. In general, for a given input ( L , n), a oracle gate generates:
Take the last term of the second output of oracle gate for input ( L , R ) and denote it as 6(L, R), i.e.
Note that: Now if the DDC is used for $(f, f , f,g), the Boolean circuit is fed with the same vector e and both A and B can be expressed as: A ( e , g l , -. . ,gm) where g; substitutes f 2 in bi. It means that $(f, f, f,g) has a DDC. This is the contradiction which proves the lemma. $( f, f, f,g ) is pseudorandom, then $( f, f, f , f 2 ) is pseudomndom. Proofi Luby and Rackoff iiotcd in [4] that any probabilistic distinguishing circuit can be converted to deterministic one. So if a generator has no DDC (see the lemma), it has no probabilistic distinguishing circuit and the generator is pseudorandom. 
Probabilistic distinguishing circuits
In this section we are going to prove that $(f, f , f, f ') is pseudorandom using probabilistic arguments. C2n($(F,G))J = Pr[C2,,($( f , f, f,y) )] is tlreprohbility that the oracle circuit generates when its oracle gates are evaluated using $(f, f, f,g) (f,g E R Fn). Proojfsketch): Note that both f and 9 can be considered as two sequences of 2'' independent and uniformly distributed random variables. For two different arguments a,6 E I,, f(a) and f ( b ) are independent random variables. When the input to an oracle gate is ( L , R ) ( L , R E In), the gate produces the output:
if it is evaluated using $(f, f, f, f3) or generates the output:
when it is evaluated according to $(f,f,f,g) (outputs of oracle gates are given after removing the input L and R, respectively). Of course the first components (random variables) of the outputs are the same.
Observe that if we have two oracle gates which are evaluated by $(f,f,f,f2) and
), their outputs yield four independent random variables.
A probabilistic distinguishing circuit generates 1 on its output with the same probability for both $(f, f , f, f2) and $(f, f, f, g ) if the random variables (the second part of the right hand side output of oracle gates) f Z ( a j ) are independent from all internal random variables : [C2,(F2,) ] is the probability that the oracle circuit generates "1" if the oracle gates are evaluated using a random function f E R Fzn. $(j, f , f, f2) is pseudorandom permutation generator.
Proof(by contradiction).
Proof is similar to that given in [4] . Denote that p j = P~[C2n($(f, f, f, !')>>I, where f E Fn is a pseudorandom function. Assume that there is a distinguishing circuit family for $(f, f , f, f 2 ) . Let it be C = (Cznl, C z , , --1, where nl < 122 < --.. It means that for large enough n, the folIowing sequence is true: 1 -I 1 PJ -P P R I=I ~f -P F + P F -P R 151 ~f -P F 1 + I P F -P R I nc where c is a constant. As I p~ -p~ I is bounded by w, I PJ -p~ 12 &. In other words the family C defines a distinguishing circuit family for pseudorandom function f. This is the contradiction and the theorem is proved.
U
All above considerations are valid for +(f, f, f, f') for fixed i = 2,3, -..
Towards provably secure block cryptosystems
The results obtained in the theory of pseudorandomness may be interpreted differently.
As we know (see [4] ), permutation generators q$( f,g, h) are pseudorandom if f , g , h are different pseudorandom functions. In general, if we use random functions instead pseudorandom ones then a permutation generator for which there is no distinguisher, is d e d a randomizer. NOW we can rephrase thc previous theorems. To make the probability in (1) sufficiently small n should be larger than 64. For n = 64 the randomizer $(f,g,hj extends 3.5 x 102'-bit random string into a random string of length 4.4 x lo4* bits. The last theorem gives the best known result and for n = 32, the randomizer +(f, f, f, ?) =<ends 1.4 x 10" bits into binary string of length 3.5 x lo2'. Unfortunately the probability given by (3) can be too high even for relatively small m (for instance if m = lo5 the probability is close to 1).
Zheng et al. [lo] studied the practicability of provable secure cryptosystems (PSC) and they pointed out that there is still gap between the theory (which says that PSCs exist) and the practice (any implementation needs exponential size memory to memorize random functions).
Consider €ormula,e (1,2,3) and note that both memory requirements and probabilities depend on the value of 2". Ideally, we would like to be able to select in some way memory requirements (the size of random function) and probabilities independently, possibly by introducing an additional parameter. In general, it is well known that increase of number of rounds in any cryptosystem improves its quality. Therefore, such a parameter may be the number of rounds.
There are three different approaches: where p = $( f, f , f, f2 j and f is a random function; 
J --'

3
The basic randomizer uses a random function f E F,. The resulting randomizer ! P j generates a permutation from Fzn. Both randomizers I9 and O j are permutations in F4,,.
The most important question is: TVliut w e the corresponding probabilities bounds for the first two approaches ? Ideally, we would expect that the probabilities axe expressable as:
where j is the number of iterations. hi this case, it would be possible to select small enough n so thc memory requirements could be met and at the same time, the probability ( 3 ) could be adjusted by selecting the number of concatenations. Of course, all above randomizers are based on the DES structure. It is possible to generalize this structure as is shown in [ l o ] . Maurer and Massey [5] considered codes as randomizers.
Conclusions
The generation of binary sequences that resemble truly random ones, is widely used in many different applications. Some of these applications impose especially strict requirements. One such application is cryptography. Most binary sequence generators turned to be useless from a cryptographic point of view.
Yao [S] defined a class of generators which are not distinguishable from truly random generators having polynomial size sample of output and polynomially-bounded computing resources. He called them pseudorandom.
The existance of PBG has been proved by Levin [3] providing existence of a wayone function. There several implementations of PBG using different one-way functions (see [2] ). Goldreich et al. [2] showed that PBGs can be used to construct pseudorandom function generators. Later, Luby and Rackoff [4] described pseudorandom permutation generators using three DES rounds and three pseudorandom functions.
Ohnishi improved their result by proviiig that pseudorandom permutation generators (PPGs) can be made up from three DES rounds and two pseudorandom functions. This result is optimal in the sense that usiiig a single pseudorandom function and three DES rounds, it is impossible to construct PPG (Zheng et al [O] ).
Schnor [7] was the first to pose the problem of construction of pseudorandom permutation generators using single pseudorandom functions. Zheng et al. [9] and Rueppel [S] showed that Schnors generator +(f, f , f ) is not pseudorandom. In this paper we have proved that having a single pseudorandom function and four DES rounds it is possible to construct PP Gs.
If we substitute pseudoraudom fuiictions by truly random ones in PPG, we obtain generators which are called randomizers. Their quality is expressable by their probability bound for distinguishing them from truly random permutations and does not rely on unproved assumptions (as the existance of one-way functions).
Randomizers of structure +( f, f , f, f2) ( j is a random function from F,,) stretch n x 2" input bits into 2n X 22n output bits. Zheiig et al [lo] defined provable secure cryptosysterns as randomizers. There is howevcr, a gap between the practical implementation and the theory. To make this idea implementable, more research is necessary. Especially, it is interesting to examine the influence of the number of rounds on the distinguishing probability. Also a search for new "more" efficient randomizers could bring us closer to a practical implementation of PSC. Maurer and Massey [5] pointed out codes as one of possible randomizers.
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